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Less than one in 10 large Management Information System (MIS) pro-
jects succeeds. While the procurement process is not the only factor
known to contribute to this high failure rate, it has been consistently
identified as a source of difficulty. Knowing that procurement con-
tributes to difficulty, however, is not useful if the reason it does so is
not also known. This article analyzes procurement’s contribution to
failure, and describes the reforms needed to improve opportunities for
success. The problem stems from the wide use of tender theory pro-
curement (competitive bidding), and the invalid assumption that a
specification can provide the basis for making value-oriented MIS
buying decisions. In addition, tender theory procurement interacts
with the MIS project environment to create an ethical hazard that
makes it almost impossible to succeed. The reforms needed to over-
come these problems are substantial. They require that tender theory
be set aside and replaced by partnering-oriented procurement methods.
INTRODUCTION
I n 1992, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewedManagement Information Systems (MIS) projects and concluded:
Developing and modernizing government information systems is a difficult
and complex process. Again and again, projects have run into serious trou -
ble, despite hard work by dedicated staff. They are developed late, fail to work
as planned, and cost millions — even hundreds of millions — more than
expected. The results, in missed benefits and misspent money, can be found
throughout government.1
Failure is not confined to government. In 1994, the Standish Group
presented these alarming statistics: only 16.2 percent of all MIS projects
(less than 9 percent of large-company projects) are completed on time
and within budget, with all required functions and features. Over 52
percent of projects are over budget, late, and offer fewer features and
functions than originally specified. Almost one-third of projects (31.1
percent) are canceled.2 The cost of this failure is staggering. The Standish
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Group estimated that $81 billion would be spent in
1995 by American organizations for canceled pro-
jects, and that an additional $59 billion would be
spent for late projects.
Until recently, MIS project failures attracted little
systematic attention. Now, however, attention is
turning to the causes of failure and the steps that
must be taken to improve opportunities for suc-
cess. Several reports have indicated that failure
cannot be attributed to a single factor, and that
improving opportunities for success will require
action on several fronts.3
The purpose of this article is to:
• examine the role of procurement as a contrib-
utor to the failure of MIS projects
• provide an analysis of how procurement con-
tributes to failure
• describe the procurement reform required to
improve opportunities for success
It is not the contention of this article that pro-
curement reform will, by itself, address all the
issues that confront MIS projects. It is this author’s
contention, however, that procurement reform is
vital, and unless it occurs, other necessary
improvements will have limited impact on the
overall success of MIS projects.
PROCUREMENT’S ROLE AND
CONTRIBUTION
The procurement process has been consistently
identified as a contributing factor to MIS project
f a i l u r e s .4 Knowing that the procurement process
contributes to failure, however, is not useful
enough. The reasons for the failure must also be
known.
Procurement’s contribution to MIS project fail-
ure stems from several sources:
• Current MIS procurement processes are
based largely on tender-theory procurement
(competitive bidding).Tender theory is well
established, widely practiced in public and
private sectors, and has served both well.
However, its strengths are also it weaknesses,
and they create resistance to change. It is dif-
ficult for managers to understand how a
process that has worked well for other goods
and services could prove dysfunctional for
MIS projects.
• Tender-theory procurement is specification
oriented: a specification must be prepared
before the procurement process can start, and
this specification becomes an indispensable
element in completing the process. Specifica-
tions, however, provide an objective basis for
securing value only for some products. For
others, such as MIS projects, specifications
obstruct obtaining value.
• Finally, procurement processes based on ten-
der theory interact with dysfunctionalities in
the environment that characterize MIS pro-
jects; this creates an ethical hazard for the
purchasing managers involved. Succumbing
to this hazard intensifies the problems faced
by MIS projects, making it almost impossible
for them to succeed. Each of these problems is
examined in more detail below.
Tender-Theory Procurement
Under tender theory, the purchasing organization
first develops a specification concerning its
requirements. It then calls for tenders to address
the specification at a firm price. The bids submitted
are evaluated for compliance to the specification.
A contract is awarded to the supplier that meets
the specification with the lowest-priced bid.
Although there are many variations of this basic
method, they all involve specifications and a sub-
sequent bid evaluation process that rates compli-
ance to the specification. For MIS procurement, a
request for proposal (RFP) is issued rather than a
tender call. The RFP features a detailed specifica-
tion of the MIS requirements, plus evaluation criteria
for the specification.
The emphasis on the specification, and on rating
compliance to the specification, stems from the
desire to respect several principles, and a belief
that a specification-oriente d procurement process
is the most satisfactory way of ensuring that this
occurs. These principles include:
• best value
• competition
• fairness and accessibility
• transparency and openness
• prudence and probity5
Tender-theory procurement easily satisfies the
principles of competition, fairness and accessibil-
ity, transparency and openness, and, on the sur-
face at least, prudence and probity.6 Does it also
support attaining best value?
Answering this question requires an examina-
tion of best value, and the role of specifications in
securing best value.
BEST VALUE
Securing best value is one of the cornerstones of
procurement, and is emphasized particularly in
government procurement. The concept may seem
straightforward, but it is not.
Best value is not easy to establish, nor is it sim-
ply related to quoted price. Other factors besides
price need to be assessed, and at times traded off,
when trying to determine best value: quality, per-
formance characteristics, the availability of service
and follow-on support, the time required to
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deliver the good or service, and other situation-
specific quantitative or qualitative elements.7
Tender-theory procurement attempts to address
the complexities involved in assessing best value
through the specifications. Thus, procurement
specifications for MIS projects usually include a
mix of quantitative and qualitative performance
factors. It is essential that suppliers address these
factors in their proposals.
This mandate is based on the assumption that
the inclusion of such factors in the specification
provides an objective basis for comparing compet-
ing proposals and identifying the supplier that will
provide the best
value. This assump-
tion, however, is war-
ranted only for certain
types of products. The
ability of a specifica-




While specifications are essential to assessing
value for products that are commodities, specifica-
tions cannot provide an objective basis for assess-
ing value for products like custom-developed MIS
application software.
ROLE OF SPECIFICATIONS IN ASSESSING
BEST VALUE
Tender-theory procurement assumes that rating
compliance to a specification provides an objective
basis for assessing value when making a buying deci-
sion. This assumption is so ingrained that the typical
response to dysfunctional procurement outcomes is
to revisit the specification to determine what was left
out, imprecise, or wrongly stated. This response has
led to the development of increasingly complex and
detailed specifications, developed in the belief that a
specification can be written that will fully capture all
important aspects of the requirement. Is this the right
approach to take?
Consider the four broad classes of products that
organizations now buy:
• commodities
• simple, durable goods
• complex custom-built goods
• complex, knowledge-based services
As the product being bought changes from a com-
modity to a complex, knowledge-based service, rat-
ing compliance to a specification provides a progres-
sively less objective basis for selecting a supplier.
Rating compliance to a specification provides an
objective basis for making a value-oriented deci-
sion when buying commodities. They can be
graded according to clear, well-differentiated stan-
dards. It makes no sense to pay a premium for
commodities that meet the same grading standard
as lower-priced alternatives do. Selecting the sup-
plier that offers the lowest-priced, compliant-to-
the-specification commodity is the right decision.
Rating compliance can also help objectively deter-
mine the value of simple, durable goods made in
commercial quantities. Each product’s performance
“out of the box” may be tested by measuring it
against the specification, and the one that provides
the best performance for a given price can be deter-
mined. That product’s supplier is then selected.
Initial performance is not the only aspect of
value for durable goods. Life-cycle performance
also matters. For many durable goods, assessing
actual life-cycle performance before they are
bought is impossible. When actual performance
cannot be known, it must be estimated.
As soon as estimated performance is allowed
into the selection process, a step away from objec-
tivity is taken. This can create a dilemma: To get
best value, those making the selection decision
may have to defend paying a higher price, about
which there is no ambiguity, in order to ensure
better estimated life-cycle performance, about
which there is considerably uncertainty. It is not an
easy decision to make or defend.
Rating compliance to a specification becomes
less objective with complex, custom-built goods.
The fundamental problem is that while there may
be a detailed specification, during the procurement
process there is nothing that can be objectively
measured against it.
Most complex, custom-built goods are unique or
few-of-a-kind items. Until the goods are built, all
the prospective purchaser has is a supplier’s
promise to build a good that meets the specifica-
tion. The purchaser must therefore estimate the
relative probable value that will be obtained from
different supplier promises, and select the supplier
that appears to promise the best value. The process
used to determine this may be painstaking, and is
hardly as objective as measuring the performance
of an existing good against a specification.
Rating compliance does not provide an objective
basis for assessing the value of complex, knowl-
edge-based services — the type of services brought
for MIS projects — for two reasons.
First, complex, knowledge-based services exist
only in the context of the supplier-client relation-
ship. Until the relationship is established, there is
only the supplier’s potential to provide, and the
client’s potential to receive, the services. Like their
complex, custom-built goods counterparts, such 
services do not exist in a measurable (or even exper-
iential) form in advance of the selection decision.
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While specifications are essential to
assessing value for products that are
commodities, specifications cannot
provide an objective basis for assess-
ing value for products like custom-
developed MIS application software.
Second, the value of a complex, knowledge-
based service depends on the quality of the rela-
tionship between the service’s provider and its
recipient. This relationship can never be precisely
specified in advance; it is too creative and
dynamic. Writing a specification for the relation-
ship would require someone to define the terms
and conditions associated with a constantly chang-
ing experience. It is simply not feasible.
As a result, for the complex, knowledge-based
services brought to complete MIS projects, it is
impossible to write a precise and detailed specifi-
cation of the required services. Even if such a speci-
fication could be written, unless the client has 
previously experienced the supplier’s service,
there is nothing to measure against it. Therefore,
what is being compared when tender theory is
applied to MIS? The compliance of promises that
cannot be experienced against requirements that
cannot be stated. However painstakingly this com-
parison is done, it is not objective.
DYSFUNCTIONALITIES IN THE MIS
PROJECT ENVIRONMENT
Tender-theory procurement’s final contribution to the
failure rate of MIS projects is the ethical hazard it cre-
ates. Procurement based on tender theory interacts
with the environment that characterizes MIS projects
to reinforce dysfunctionalities in project and risk
management. These dysfunctionalities make it diffi-
cult to secure value under the best circumstances and
intensify the problems facing MIS projects.
MIS projects and associated procurements take
place in an environment characterized by the 
following:
• Lack of management continuity: Most large
MIS projects are planned for completion over
several years. During this time period, it is not
unusual for there to be changes in management.
• An incentive system that encourages overly
optimistic estimates of the benefits that can be
attained from doing the project, and discour-
ages realistic estimates of the costs that will be
incurred: In addition, getting a project proposal
approved requires developing a long-term pro-
ject plan and milestone schedule. Planners
know that the further one gets from the present
date, the less likely it is that any event will
occur as planned. Despite this, plans, once set,
are difficult to change or even report progress
against truthfully. As noted by the GAO:
“Because changes in plans and cost estimates
are seen as indicators of poor management,
project managers try to maintain a pretense of
problem-free development and avoid providing
honest assessments of project risks. By not
mentioning problems for as long as possible,
managers can often ensure continued project
funding — at least in the near term ... Since
agencies frequently change project managers,
it becomes easy to defer problems to others.”8
Tender-theory procurement interacts destruc-
tively with each of these factors.
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nity for changes in management and in the t e c h-
nology that may be appropriate to the project. Both
factors add to the risk of failure.
MIS projects usually have several formal phases
in which separate procurement processes are used
to select the supplier to complete each phase.
Phased procurement was originally introduced to
reduce risk, and does to an extent. It also intro-
duces opportunity to transfer problems to subse-
quent phases, and reinforces the tendency of those
managing MIS projects to maintain a pretense of
problem-free development and avoid providing
honest assessments of project risks.
MIS specifications are developed progressively,
over a series of phases, with each phase designed
to progressively define the requirement. Often
each phase is undertaken on the basis of contracts
awarded using tender-theory procurement to
select the supplier submitting the firm, lowest-
priced bid to complete the work in a phase. In the
early phases of the project, when the requirement
is imperfectly understood and the objective of the
phase is to develop understanding, procurement
on a firm price basis is absurd. It is nevertheless
routinely done.
When contracts are awarded in such a manner,
the usual result is that the end of the attempt to
develop an understanding of the requirement cor-
responds closely to the exhaustion of the firm-
price budget for the phase. Whether this actually
corresponds to the point at which the requirement
is understood is another question. Frequently, both
the client department and its supplier know it does
not. Nevertheless, because there is pressure to be
on time and within budget, this knowledge can be
set aside, the phase can be declared closed, and the
project can proceed to the next phase with the
hope that anything left unresolved or unexplored
can be addressed in the next phase.
This practice of declaring phases complete — and
judging the specifications developed in them to be
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In the early phases of the project, 
when the requirement is imperfectly
understood and the objective of the
phase is to develop understanding, 
procurement on a firm price basis 
is absurd. It is nevertheless 
routinely done.
fully acceptable — can be repeated to maintain an
illusion of steady progress and success, but only up
to a point. Sooner or later the project’s building phase
arrives. At this critical point — the point at which
there is no next phase — projects collapse.9
Despite this result, and despite the over 90-
percent failure rate of MIS projects, organizations
persist in both applying tender-theory procurement
to these projects, and in attempting to select suppli-
ers on the basis of rating a supplier’s promise to
comply at the low-
est-cost to a specifi-
cation. The ques-
tion is why?




ment, to be able
defend the buying
decision at the time it is made, even though the
value, if any, that arises from the decision will not
be realized until months or years later. The easiest
defense is to point out that the supplier quoting
the lowest contact price was the one selected.
Second is the specification orientation of the 
tender theory itself, and its erroneous logic of pro-
ducing ever more detailed, lengthy, and costly
specifications. The development of such lengthy
and detailed specifications for MIS solutions is an
attempt to “commoditize” the purchasing decision
— to develop a specification that makes it possible
to make the purchasing decision in the same way it
is made for commodities, by awarding the contract
to the supplier quoting the lowest price to meet the
specification. This type of purchasing decision,
however, cannot be commoditized. Rather than
securing best value, or even acceptable value, the
attempt to commoditize the decision results in pro-
curement processes that are costly to initiate, time
consuming, and tend to result in adversarial rela-
tionships between clients and suppliers. Neither
party’s requirements or expectations are satisfied,
and significant time and cost overruns are the norm.
IMPROVING OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR MIS SUCCESS
As noted at the onset of this article, improving the
success rate of MIS projects requires action on sev-
eral fronts. In addition to reforming procurement,
more attention must be given to the following areas: 
• risk assessment during the initial planning
• project management once a project is underway
• risk management during the subsequent exe-
cution of the project
With regard to improving procurement, it is
clear that the necessary improvements will entail
more than modest refinements to existing
processes. The flaws in tender-theory procurement
are, for MIS procurement, fundamental. Merely
trying to expedite the process, in the belief that the
processes are too slow to keep pace with rapidly
changing technology, will not be sufficient.
The type of reform that is needed will appear
radical to many. Tender-theory procurement, and
the use of specifications as the basis for making the
purchasing decision, must be set aside for MIS
projects.10 If tender theory is to be set aside, what
will replace it?
Partnering-Oriented Procurement
A promising method of procurement that has been
pilot tested and selectively implemented is estab-
lishing longer-term “partnering” relationships
between suppliers and their clients. This method
focuses on the business problem to be solved —
and supplier qualifications with regard to that
problem — rather than on the development of
detailed specifications for a solution. This method
includes:
• Accelerated supplier selection. Unlike ten-
der-theory procurement, in which the sup-
plier selection process can last for months or
years, these methods have supplier selection
processes that typically take no more than
several weeks.
• Lower cost for both suppliers and clients to
complete the supplier selection process.
Tens, possibly hundreds, of thousands of dol-
lars may easily be spent in procurement initi-
ation activities such as creating the specifica-
tion required to move forward with
tender-theory procurement. These new meth-
ods feature requests for proposals that are 20
to 30 pages in length, and require that pro-
posals not exceed that length.
• No specifications. These methods proceed
from a statement of the business problems to be
solved. This is all. There is no specification.
There is no description of the solution required.
There is not even a statement of work. There
are only statements of the problem, the qualifi-
cations being sought in the supplier “partner,”
and of the basis upon which prospective sup-
plier “partner” will be assessed.
• Relinquishing the objective of trying to secure
the lowest possible price. Tender theory’s l o w -
cost, compliant-to-the-specification model of
value is viewed as both unrealistic and unat-
tainable, and as having contributed to corro-
sive relations between suppliers and clients
that serve neither party’s interests over the life
of the MIS solution. These methods focus,
instead, on a price that both parties can be sat-
isfied is reasonable given the nature of the
problem, the risks involved in solving it, and
the benefits that will accrue from a solution.
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Rather than securing best value, 
or even acceptable value, the attempt 
to commoditize the decision results in 
procurement processes that are costly 
to initiate, time consuming, and tend to
result in adversarial relationships 
between clients and suppliers.
If this sounds too good to be true, it is important
to note the following:
• The agreements negotiated as a result of these
methods tend to have much greater complex-
ity, and are more challenging to establish
than contracts struck under tender-theory
procurement. One reason for this is that these
methods seek to establish alliances between
suppliers and client departments in which
both risks and rewards are shared.
• The process is also a more demanding process
for all the participants. Although tender-theory
procurement involves hard work, as a process
it is essentially routine. These new methods
represent such a fundamental change in orien-
tation that they require a major change in atti-
tudes. Often, attitude change of this magnitude
will only be forthcoming if there is a high
degree of commitment to the method among
all stakeholders in the MIS solution.
One example of this process is now in use in the
Province of Nova Scotia. Developed in the summer
of 1994, it is known as Cooperative Business Solu-
tions (CBS). In late 1995, the Province of Ontario
launched its own variant, Common Purpose Pro-
curement. Both programs are refinements and
extensions of an experimental procurement method
developed for the Canadian federal government by
a joint industry/government working group.
CONCLUSIONS
There are complex interdependencies among the
factors that contribute to the success of MIS pro-
jects. Improving the opportunities for success of
these projects, therefore, requires action on a num-
ber of fronts. This includes reform aligned to the
implementation of a partnering-oriented approach
to procurement on MIS projects.
However, no one action — for example, chang-
ing procurement methods — is going to produce a
quantum jump in the probability of success. By the
same token, failure to take action on all fronts,
including procurement reform, will significantly
constrain opportunity for success.
It is difficult to overemphasize this last point.
There is ample evidence that even when strong
project management is applied to an MIS project, it
will not recover the project from the problems that
stem from using tender-theory procurement to
select a supplier.1 1 Likewise, the Canadian federal
government’s pilot of  a partnering-oriented 
procurement method, Common Purpose Procure-
ment, revealed that a procurement method unsup-
ported by strong project and risk management can
also lead to project failure. The required reforms
must go hand in hand.
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